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Calculating tragedy: Assessing the costs of terrorism
Abstract
The trends and consequences of terrorist activities are often captured by counting the number of
incidents and casualties. More recently, the effects of terrorist acts on various aspects of the economy
have been analyzed. These costs are surveyed and put in perspective. As economic consequences are
only a part of the overall costs of terrorism, possible approaches for estimating the utility losses of the
people affected are discussed. Results using the life satisfaction approach, in which individual utility is
approximated by self-reported subjective well-being, suggest that people's utility losses may far exceed
the purely economic consequences.
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CALCULATING TRAGEDY:
ASSESSING THE COSTS OF TERRORISM
1 Introduction
Most people take it for granted that terrorism is the major plague we are now dealing with
in the 21st century. On a number of occasions, terrorists succeeded in inflicting massive
civilian casualties and colossal damage, as in the case of the attacks on the World Trade
Towers in New York on September 11, 2001, and the bombings of three railway stations
in Madrid on March 11, 2004. Although, in connection with the proliferation of religious
terrorism, the propensity for spectacular large-scale attacks increased, terrorism is not
restricted to Islamic militants in general and al Queda in particular. Rather, many
countries were plagued by terrorist campaigns in the 20th century. Fighters in anti-
colonial struggles, ethnic separatist groups, revolutionary left-wing terrorists and their
right-wing counterparts all tried to harm their opponents in order to force them to yield to
their demands or overthrow them (see e.g. Hoffman 1998; Wilkinson 2000). In addition
to the direct losses incurred and the climate of fear evoked by terrorist attacks, counter-
terrorism policies can further impair daily life and economic development in terrorism-
ridden countries.1
This paper aims to show that the damage done by terrorism can be empirically measured.2
In recent years, economic scholars have analyzed the effects terrorist acts have on various
aspects of the economy and society. We briefly discuss how the extent of terrorism is
measured and the most important trends in international terrorism (section 2). The
following section assesses empirical studies on the impact of terrorism on tourism,
foreign direct investment, savings and consumption, investments, stock markets, foreign
                                                 
1 Terrorism can have serious effects on other aspects of society, such as on politics. Thus, the terrorist
attack in Madrid on March 11, 2004 resulted in a sudden and substantial drop in the votes going to the
reigning Partido Popular, so that it lost the election which it had looked virtually certain to win before.
This loss has been largely attributed to the incompetent reaction on the part of the government to the attack
(Financial Times 2004, p. 11). Studying the relationship between terrorist attacks in Israel and the occupied
territories from 1990 and 2003 and electoral outcomes in Israel, Berrebi and Klor (2004) find that relative
support for the rightist party increases after periods with high levels of terrorism and decreases after
relatively calm periods.
2 No general survey on the economic research on terrorism is provided in this paper; this has been done
elsewhere. See e.g. Enders and Sandler (1995), Frey and Luechinger (2003) and Sandler and Enders (2004).
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trade, urbanization and overall economic development, including the costs of the attacks
of September 11, 2001.3 Several estimates of the effects of terrorism will be given, but it
is, of course, not possible to come up with one single figure for the economic damages
caused by terrorism. Moreover, the overall effects of terrorism may well exceed the
economic consequences. Therefore, possible approaches for estimating the utility losses
of the population affected, as well as first results, are discussed in section 4. Section 5
offers concluding remarks.
2 Counting terrorist acts and casualties
Most studies assessing the tragedy of terrorism rely on indicators of terrorist activity.4
Some of the social science literature uses these measures directly to evaluate the harm
suffered. In the research surveyed below, measures of terrorist activity are used as an
input to calculate the various costs of terrorism to the economy. This section, therefore,
briefly discusses how terrorist activity is captured in international statistics.
A frequently used indicator is the number of terrorist incidents. However, counting the
number of terrorist incidents means that terrorist activities of widely varying magnitude
are lumped together. The attacks on the World Trade Center would be counted as one (or
perhaps two) event(s), the same as taking one person as a hostage. Such measurements
can capture developments in terrorism only if the structure of terrorist events remains
more or less unchanged. Thus, measuring the number of incidents makes sense if the
percentage of hostage takings and major attacks remains approximately constant. The
varying intensity of terrorist attacks is often captured by the number of casualties. Some
data only use the number of persons killed, while other data also take into consideration
the number of people injured.
                                                 
3 Related issues not discussed in this paper are the effects of terrorism on fiscal policy (see e.g. Eichenbaum
and Fisher 2004; Gupta et al. 2004) and the discussion about the insurability of terrorism risks (see e.g.
Cummins and Lewis 2003; Kunreuther et al. 2003; Brown et al. 2004). Precursors interested in the general
interaction between war, peace and economic conditions are Pigou (1916; 1921), Keynes (1919) and
Robbins (1940). More recent contributions, analyzing the interaction of conflict and economic activity, are
Hess and Orphanides (1995; 2001), Garfinkel (1990; 1994), Grossman (1991) and Collier and Hoeffler
(2004).
4 Exceptions are Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), who use a truce unilaterally declared by the ETA in the
late 1990s as a natural experiment, and the studies focusing on the consequences of specific incidents, such
as the September 11, 2001 attacks discussed in section 3.
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Another problem is that only those terrorist events reflected in official statistics and
reported in the media are counted. Reliance on official statistics is often mistaken,
because either the authorities themselves do not know or deliberately bias their reporting.
The media only pick up on some terrorist events, mostly those occurring in the larger
cities or the capital of the country, where the foreign journalists normally reside. Terrorist
action taking place in remote rural areas is rarely, if ever, reported in the media. The
problem of biased reporting is especially severe in less developed and authoritarian
countries (see e.g. Miller 1994).
The problems associated with the limits of comparing different types of attacks and of
biased reporting of attacks have been addressed in various ways in the literature. First, the
analysis is usually confined to developed countries where the reporting bias is less of a
problem. Second, the consequences are often estimated for a small number of countries,
or even a single country, where modes of attack are comparable across countries and over
time (exceptions are the combined cross-country and time-series analyses of Blomberg et
al. 2004a; Nitsch and Schumacher 2004 discussed below). Third, some authors explicitly
differentiate between attacks of different types and at different locations (see e.g. Drakos
and Kutan 2003; Fielding 2003b).
In the case of international terrorism, where foreign interests are involved, the reporting
bias is likely to be less severe. Employing the official US definition of terrorism (22 USC
§ 2656f[d]), the US Department of State issues series covering the annual number of
incidents of international terrorism and the number of fatalities. International terrorism is
defined as terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country. These
series are depicted in figure 1.
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Figure 1: International terrorism, 1968-2003, number of incidents and number of fatalities
Source: US Department of State (various years) and Sandler and Enders (2004).
The number of terrorist events recorded in this statistic varies considerably from 125 in
1968 to 665 in 1987.5 Since reaching a peak in the late 1980s, the number of incidents has
been on the decline. This finding contrasts with the general notion that terrorism has
become an ever-increasing threat. The number of people killed in terrorist incidents also
varies considerably, from 34 in 1968 to 3,250 in 2001. No clear trend is visible and the
series is greatly influenced by spectacular events, such as the simultaneous bombing of
the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and the attacks of September 11,
2001. As these series exhibit, the level of international terrorist acts is on the decline,
while the number of fatalities has not been reduced as much. This implies that terrorism
has become increasingly lethal – a common observation made by scholars studying
terrorism. According to Enders and Sandler (2002), an incident in recent years is about 17
percentage points more likely to result in casualties than in the 1970s. This increase in
lethality has been attributed to the increasing proportion of fundamentalist terrorist
                                                 
5 It is, however, important to keep in mind that international terrorist acts are only a small fraction of all
terrorist attacks taking place. In the years 1998 to 2002, the number of recorded domestic terrorist incidents
was around 11 times higher than the number of international terrorist incidents; the respective number for
fatalities is around 4 times higher (see the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Databases; www.mipt.org).
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groups seeking mass casualties of innocent people to make their cause more widely
known. In contrast, the leftist-based terrorists and nationalist terrorists want to instigate a
revolution and aim at winning the hearts of the people. They therefore avoid killing or
maiming innocent people not directly connected with the existing political and economic
regime.
Further, using spectral analysis on a quarterly index of various terrorist activities
(ITERATE, International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events; see Mickolus 1982
and Mickolus et al. 1989; 1993), a number of cycles have been identified (Enders and
Sandler 2002). Logistically complicated incidents, such as large-scale suicide car
bombings, the hijacking of planes and assassinations have longer cycles than less
sophisticated events. Terrorist activity developing in cycles, rather than as a continuous
movement in one direction, has been attributed to various causes: demonstration and
imitation effects act as propagators; economies of scale in planning terrorist incidents
lower the cost for a restricted period of time; after a terrorist act there is a public outcry,
inducing the authorities to take drastic measures which, again for a restricted period of
time, reduce international terrorist activity. This “attack-counterattack cycle” results in
fluctuations.
3 Terrorism’s impact on various aspects of the economy
Over the last few years, scholars have analyzed the effects terrorist acts have on various
aspects of the economy. In the following, the results for tourism, foreign direct
investment, savings and consumption, investment, stock markets, foreign trade, the urban
economy (including the costs of the attacks of September 11, 2002), and overall
economic development are surveyed.
1. Tourism. Tourists have become a frequent target of terrorist activities in recent years,6
generating huge resonance in the media. Examples are the Luxor massacre in 1997, in
which members of an Egyptian Islamic group shot dead 58 foreign tourists visiting the
temple of Queen Hatshepsut in the Valley of the Queens, and the bombing of a disco in
                                                 
6 It is argued that tighter security measures for military and government facilities made tourists relatively
more attractive for terrorist attacks (see e.g. Im et al. 1987).
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Bali in 2002, costing the lives of almost 200 tourists. There is a simple rationale for these
attacks. Individuals planning their holidays are less likely to choose a destination with a
higher threat of terrorist attacks. Host countries providing tourism services, which can be
easily substituted are, therefore, negatively affected by terrorist attacks to a substantial
extent. The expected reactions from consumers make the bombing, shooting and
kidnapping of tourists attractive strategies for terrorists who want to inflict economic
damage, when pursuing their political goals. There is a fast growing literature evaluating
the effects of terrorism on tourism, focusing on the number of tourists and lost revenues
in the industry. Special attention is given to substitution issues and the temporal structure
of the effects.
In an early, influential paper, Enders and Sandler (1991) study the relationship between
international terrorism and tourism in Spain. They use monthly data on terrorist incidents
and combine it with the number of foreign visitors in Spain between 1970 and 1988,
applying VAR methodology. It is estimated that a typical terrorist act in Spain scares
away over 140,000 tourists, when all the monthly impacts are combined. In 1988, 5.392
million foreigners visited Spain and 18 international terrorist incidents took place. Hence
without these incidents, 1.5 times as many tourists would have visited Spain in 1988.
Careful econometric analyses reveal similar repercussions from terrorism on other tourist
destinations. In a time-series analysis based on quarterly terrorism data and the ARIMA
technique, Enders et al. (1992) quantify the present value of loss in tourism revenues for
a sample of European countries. According to their calculations, Austria, Italy and Greece
lost $4.538 billion, $1.159 billion and $0.77 billion respectively between 1974 and 1988
(in 1988 terms, using a real interest rate of 5%). For comparative purposes, total revenues
in these countries in 1988 amounted to $11.149 billion, $19.311 billion and $3.29 billion
respectively. For the same period, continental Europe as a whole lost $16.145 billion due
to terrorism (total tourist revenues in 1988 were $74.401 billion). Fleischer and Buccola
(2002) estimate a supply and demand model of the Israeli hotel industry to assess the
impact of terrorism. Foreign demand and equilibrium prices are allowed to be influenced
by a monthly index, capturing the severity of the terrorist campaign in Israel. The annual
revenue shortfalls between 1992 and 1998 in the market with foreign visitors sum up to
approximately $50 million (1998 present value discounted at 5%) or 1.27% of total
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revenues in this period. Though these revenue losses are relatively modest, they increase
with a deterioration of the situation. In 1996, a year of Middle East unrest, the revenue
shortfall amounted to 2.55%. Further, it is claimed that, due to inelastic local demand,
hotels could not easily compensate these losses by cutting prices.
Two recent studies look at the effect of an intensification of extraordinary terrorist events
on US tourist receipts and US airline demand. Sloboda (2003) uses ARMAX
methodology to analyze annual time series of the number of terror attacks on US interests
and US tourism receipts for the period 1988 to 2001, and estimates the effect of the Gulf
War in 1991 and the accompanying increase in anti-American attacks on tourism
revenues. In 1991, the number of incidents on US interests roughly doubled; this shock
had a temporary negative impact on the tourism industry, which lasted until 2000.
Aggregating the annual impacts of this initial shock (i.e. the impact of the increase in
terrorism in later years is not included), total losses in revenue are approximately $57
billion (1996 present value discounted at 5%). Ito and Lee (2004) assess the impact of the
September 11 attacks and the imposition of stringent new security requirements on
domestic airline demand in the USA. The authors estimate a reduced form model of
demand for air services with monthly time-series data since 1986 and model the post-
September 11 period as an attenuating shock process, that has both a transitory and an
ongoing component. After controlling for cyclical, seasonal and other unique events
impacting the industry, the initial demand shock is estimated to be more than 30%
measured in revenue passenger miles (RPMs), and 7.3% measured in yields. The decline
in yield is smaller because a large number of airline tickets are purchased well in
advance. In addition to the transitory shock, there is an ongoing downward shift in the
demand of 7.4% measured in RPMs and of 10% measured in yields. The decline in
demand is especially pronounced in the short-haul market, where more substitution
possibilities are available. On the basis of a counterfactual demand prediction the authors
conclude that the terror attacks and security measures account for roughly 94% of the
decline in RPMs from the historical peak.
Estimated impacts of terrorism on tourism vary considerably, because the structure of the
tourism industry and terror campaigns differ, not only across countries, but also over
time. This hampers comparisons between studies. Instead, it emphasizes the importance
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of differentiating between different types of attacks, e.g. the location of an attack (i.e.
whether it takes place in an urban or a rural area) and the number of casualties (see e.g.
Drakos and Kutan 2003).
Some scholars argue that terrorism could also be a reaction to irresponsible tourism
development (e.g. Aziz 1995, p. 93, for Egypt). In the aforementioned study for Spain by
Enders and Sandler (1991), the argument is empirically assessed. It is found that causality
is unidirectional, i.e. terrorism affects the inflow of tourists, but not the reverse.
The figures presented so far measure how the tourism industry in a particular country (or
region) is affected by terrorist attacks taking place in that country (or region). However,
two interdependencies between different countries’ tourism industries and their terrorist
campaigns are possible. On the one hand, the deterrent effect of terrorism on tourists in a
particular country may benefit the tourism industries in alternative destinations. On the
other hand, tourists may fear that terrorism could spill over into countries previously not
involved and, therefore, abstain from visiting neighboring countries. Though the
substitution effect and the contagion effect (or negative externality) are countervailing,
they can be simultaneously present. The regional interdependencies are explicitly
modeled in the analysis of Drakos and Kutan (2003). Using monthly data for the period
1991 to 2000 and employing the SURE method, they investigate the effect of terrorism in
Greece, Israel and Turkey on each other’s market share, with Italy serving as a control
country, representing the rest of the Mediterranean region. Their findings indicate that
there are significant substitution effects. But there is also empirical evidence for the
contagion effect: only around 11% of aggregate loss in market shares is directed toward
other destinations within the group of countries under consideration, whereas around 89%
flows out of the region. Enders et al. (1992) study the effects of terrorism for a series of
European countries. They estimate the aggregate losses in revenue for Austria, Greece
and Italy to amount to $ 4.467 billion. Although they find no significant effect of
terrorism in other continental European countries on the tourism revenues, the loss of
tourism revenues due to terrorism for continental Europe as a whole is estimated to be
$16.145 billion. Therefore, continental Europe as a whole is much more negatively
affected by terrorism than the sum of the country-by-country effects would imply. This
result is again evidence for a contagion effect or negative externalities.
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A note of caution is in order with regard to the temporal patterns of the impact of
terrorism on tourism.7 The temporal pattern depends on the type of attacks in a particular
country, and the market structure as well as the type of time-series used by researchers.
Time-series on the number of actual visits are likely to respond more quickly to a terrorist
incident than time-series on tourism revenues, due to long-term contracts between tourist
destinations and tour operators. Nevertheless, surprisingly different time spans are
estimated until tourism begins to respond to a terrorist incident after it has elapsed. While
Enders and Sandler (1991) and Fleischer and Buccola (2002) find relatively immediate
effects of terrorism on tourism, i.e. after two to three months, for Spain and Israel
respectively, Enders et al. (1992) find tourism to be unaffected by a terrorist incident
until a full 18 to 21 months afterwards in the case of continental Europe and Austria
respectively.
To summarize, terrorism systematically influences tourists’ choice of destination and can,
therefore, substantially negatively affect a host country. Moreover, the effect is long-
lasting and has an impact on the demand for tourism in neighboring countries. It remains
an open question whether tourists’ reactions to the threat of terrorism are rational.
According to a RAND survey conducted in 1989, a third of those Americans interviewed
said they would refuse the opportunity to travel abroad because of the risk of terrorism
(Downes-Le Guin and Hoffman 1993). It is hard to think of similar precautionary
measures against life-threatening eventualities taking place with the same likelihood.
More generally, Viscusi and Zeckhauser (2003) find that people are subject to a
propensity to predict worst-case scenarios in assessing terrorism risks and are prone to
anomalies known from other risk perception contexts. Similarly, Sunstein (2003) shows
that individuals focus on the badness of the outcome rather than on the probability that it
will occur. The “probability neglect” results in fear that greatly exceeds discounted harm.
2. Foreign direct investment (FDI). Terrorism affects the allocation decision of firms
investing money in real foreign assets. Terrorists can quite easily attack and damage
foreign owned firms, seriously disrupting their activities. As the foreigners have a large
                                                 
7 This is particularly important as, in studies based on time-series methods, the monthly or quarterly
impacts are aggregated to assess the total impact of a terrorist incident. Hence, the plausibility of the
temporal pattern needs careful attention.
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choice of countries to invest in, even quite mild terrorist activities tend to considerably
reduce the inflow of capital to a terror-stricken country.
This has been well documented in the case of Spain and Greece, again using VAR
methodology and quarterly terrorism data (Enders and Sandler 1996). In Spain, terrorism
is estimated to have reduced annual FDI inflow by 13.5% on average for the period 1975-
1991. This translates into a decline in real FDI of almost 500 million dollars. In a similar
period of time (1976-1991), Greece was plagued by two major terrorist organizations, the
17 November and the Revolutionary Popular Struggle. Both are extreme left-wing
movements. The reduction of FDI was estimated to be, on average, 11.9% annually. This
translates into a loss amounting to almost 400 million dollars. As FDI is an important
source of savings, investment and economic growth are negatively affected. Moreover,
the transfer of technological know-how into the country is reduced, again putting a
damper on growth. Thus, the economic costs are substantial.8
3. Savings and consumption. Apart from foreign direct investment, the investment rate is
mainly constrained by the domestic savings rate. Consumption and, hence, savings rates
may be affected by terrorist activity in different ways. On the one hand, political violence
might increase perceived risks associated with savings, either because legal claims on
assets are compromised or because individuals are prevented from spending the money
their savings have earned. On the other hand, terrorism may induce individuals to place
their money in safe havens rather than buy, for example, durable consumer goods. The
two effects point in opposite directions; how consumption is affected by terrorism is,
therefore, ultimately an empirical question. However, the empirical evidence is also
ambiguous. Fielding (2003a) uses the variation in political tensions and violence in Israel
over time to analyze the impact of political instability on Israeli aggregate consumption
and thus on aggregate savings. He hypothesizes that the perceived insecurity depends
mainly on the number of deaths in Israel proper and/or the number of deaths in the West
Bank and Gaza areas, as well as the rate of growth of the Jewish settlements in the West
Bank and Gaza areas. To investigate the impact of political instability on Israeli savings,
Fielding (2003a) estimates a macro-econometric consumption function for Israel in the
                                                 
8 For three larger European nations, namely France, West Germany and Italy, Enders and Sandler (1996)
find no impact of terrorism on FDI.
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period 1989-1999 with quarterly data including the indicators of political instability
mentioned. This permits the computation of how aggregate private sector consumption
would change if there were to be a complete cessation of the conflict (measured by these
indicators). If the number of fatalities in Israel proper decreased by its average level,
consumption would fall by over 7%. The respective number for a reduction of fatalities in
the West Bank and Gaza areas is over 5%. In contrast, the effect of freezing settlement
construction would be negligibly small. Given Israel’s poor savings performance, the
effect would be huge. According to Fielding (2003a, p. 309), “the savings ratio in Israel
would almost double as a result of a complete cessation of violence.” Eckstein and
Tsiddon (2004), in contrast, using VAR methodology estimates with quarterly data for
the Israeli economy from 1950-2003, find a negative effect of terrorism on consumption.
They expect that the continued terror (of a size similar to the number of deaths due to car
accidents) will decrease annual consumption per capita by about 5% in 2004.
4. Investment. The effect of terrorism on aggregate consumption and savings is important
as it influences the investment level and, hence, economic growth. In addition, one can
hypothesize that political violence not only affects the level of investments but also the
composition of investments (Collier 1999). Investments in non-traded capital goods, or
non-residential construction, are particularly risky in an environment of political
instability. Such investments may, therefore, be reduced more than investments in
machinery and equipment if political violence increases. Using a macro-econometric
quarterly time-series model of investment in Israel for the period 1988-1998, conditioned
on indicators of political instability, Fielding (2003b) investigates the impact of political
instability on the level and composition of investments. To analyze the impact on the
composition of investments, two investment equations, one for non-traded capital goods
and one for machinery and equipment, are estimated. As an increase in investment in one
category has a positive effect on investments in the other category, the dynamic effect
between these two categories is important in calculating the total effect. The indicators of
political instability are the number of Jews killed, the number of Palestinians killed and
the rate of growth of the Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza areas. Fielding
(2003b) finds both the number of Israelis killed and the rate of growth of Jewish
settlements to have a significantly negative impact on investment in non-residential
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construction. Manufacturing and equipment investment is significantly lowered by an
increase in the total number of deaths and the rate of growth of settlements.9 Again, a
“peace dividend”, or the implicit increase in investment from a complete cessation of the
conflict, can be estimated. Were the number of deaths to drop to zero, construction
investment would be 27.9% higher and machinery and equipment investment would be
14.6% higher in the steady state. The different magnitude of these two effects confirms
that investment composition is affected by political violence. In comparison to the impact
of fatalities, the likely impact of a cessation of the expansion of settlements would again
be small: the respective figures are 2.77% and 1.10%. Overall, these effects are huge and
would be even larger if second order effects were taken into consideration. For example,
a stabilization of the political situation is likely to accelerate economic growth and,
therefore, raise investment demand even further.
6. Stock markets. In the aftermath of spectacular attacks, the impact on financial markets
is usually widely discussed in the media. Stock prices are a potentially informative
measure of the economic damage of terrorism. Stock prices reflect expected future gains
of a company, as well as the likelihood that these expected gains materialize. Terrorist
attacks influence both: (i) Expected profits are lower if security measures increase the
costs of production and doing business, and if consumers’ fear reduces demand, like in
the airline industry. (ii) The risk premium is higher when terrorism leads to increased
uncertainty about a firm’s prospects on the market.10 Empirically, the difficulty is in
disentangling investors’ decentralized evaluation of a firm’s costs from terrorism, as
reflected in the stock price, from a host of other factors. When looking for a contra
factual market capitalization, one has, for example, to take into consideration that stock
prices already reflect expected terrorist attacks before any event actually occurs. Previous
research, therefore, has concentrated on single unexpected events or intensifications of
terrorist activities.
                                                 
9 Why the different investment decisions are influenced by different fatality series remains a puzzle
(Fielding 2003b, p. 175).
10 The effect of terrorism on the systematic risk (beta) is studied for the events of September 11. In a sample
of US firms from various sectors, models with time-varying betas find very heterogeneous effects of the
event (Choudhry 2003). For the airline industry around the world, however, there is a clear structural break.
Conditional systematic risk, on average, doubled following September 11, 2001, whereby US airlines were
most affected (Drakos 2004).
- 14 -
An event which has been carefully analyzed is the cease-fire the Basque ETA declared
between 1998 and 1999 (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003). This can be taken to be a natural
experiment to estimate the cost of the terrorist conflict in terms of its effect on the stock
value of a sample of Basque and non-Basque firms. If the terrorist conflict was perceived
to have a negative effect on the Basque economy, stocks of firms with a significant part
of their business activity in the Basque country should exhibit a positive relative
performance when the truce began, and a negative relative performance when the truce
ended. Basque stocks did indeed outperform non-Basque stocks as the truce became
credible. The compounded abnormal returns for the 22 trading sessions of the good news
period were 10.14% for the Basque portfolio relative to the non-Basque portfolio. At the
end of the cease-fire, Basque stocks showed a negative performance relative to non-
Basque stocks (with a relative loss over 66 trading sessions of 11.21%).
In a broad event study for 14 terrorist/military attacks, returns on the US capital market
are analyzed (Chen and Siems 2004). Empirically, deviations of the Dow Jones Industrial
stock index returns from past average returns (30 to 11 trading days before the event) are
studied for different time frames. Military attacks in the past, like the invasion of France
(May 12, 1940), or the one in North Korea (June 25, 1950), led to substantial negative
cumulative abnormal returns when measured over 11 trading days. In contrast, there are
no abnormal returns even on the actual day of the event of terrorist bombing attacks on
Pan Am (December 21, 1988), the World Trade Center (February 26, 1993), Oklahoma
City (April 19, 1995) or the US Embassy in Kenya (August 7, 1998). The single recent
terrorist event, that even after six trading days showed negative cumulative abnormal
returns, was September 11, 2001.
It is, however, difficult to relate the size and duration of abnormal returns to fundamental
economic costs. Stock market fluctuations are likely to be larger than the underlying
changes in fundamental values, because investors also buy and sell based on expectations
about others’ behavior (Shiller 2003). This may explain why, after months of experience
with the Israeli Palestinian conflict, the stock market in Israel still reacts with a similar
magnitude to suicide bombings (Eldor and Melnick 2004), although one might think that
underlying fundamental expectations do not systematically change with each new
incident. Overall, the Israeli Palestinian conflict reduced the stock market capitalization
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substantially. Whilst up until the intensification of the conflict on September 27, 2000,
S&P 500 and the Israeli stock market developed in a very similar way, after this date the
latter’s performance dropped considerably. Compared to a simulation without terrorism,
the index was 30% lower in June 30, 2003 (Eldor and Melnick 2004).
Some multiplier of terrorist attacks on firm values lies in the capital market itself. As far
as events affect the technological functioning of capital markets, for example, by
interrupted interbank payments, liquidity shortages can lead to reduced system stability,
even with the danger of consumer panic. Recent experience with the mature US banking
system, however, shows that an adequate provision of liquidity by the central bank can
prevent such potential damage. After September 11, 2001, the Federal Reserve at one
point injected more than $ 100 billion in additional liquidity (Lacker 2004).
7. Foreign trade. Terrorist activities can affect foreign trade in several ways. First, the
costs of doing business are raised by a general increase in insecurity as a result of
terrorism. Second, augmented security measures in response to a terrorist campaign
increase transaction costs. Third, there is the risk of a direct destruction of traded goods.
The repeated attacks on oil pipelines in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein, which
temporarily paralyzed oil exports, are a recent example of the latter risk. Another
example is the attack launched on the French supertanker “Limburg” off Yemen’s coast
in October 2002. In many countries one of the largest export industries is the tourism
industry. As already discussed, this industry is directly affected by terrorism.
Nitsch and Schumacher (2004) use an extended gravity model, containing the
conventional determinants and, in addition, the annual number of international terrorist
attacks in a country to assess the impact of terrorism on trade between more than 200
countries for the period 1968 to 1979. According to their results, countries targeted by
terrorism trade significantly less with each other than countries not affected by terrorism.
Moreover, the effect is economically large: a doubling of the number of terrorist incidents
reduces the bilateral trade flows by 4%.
8. Urban economy. Terrorism may influence the relative advantage of living in a city
compared to living in the countryside, and may thus affect urbanization: cities can exploit
the positive economies of scale of defending their population. At the same time, the high
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population density makes cities an attractive target for terrorists. Finally, violence and
terrorism raise transport costs. Transport costs can be substituted by closer physical
vicinity. The last two influences are most relevant for modern terrorism, but they point in
opposite directions. An analysis of the population development in London, Jerusalem and
Tel Aviv indicates that terrorism has had little if any impact. Despite the relative safety of
Tel Aviv, its population growth over the past 50 years actually lags behind that of
Jerusalem (Glaeser and Shapiro 2002). Similarly, cross-country evidence suggests that
the overall impact of terrorism on urbanization is likely to be small. Glaeser and Shapiro
(2002) regress a dummy variable that indicates whether a country experienced terrorism
in the period 1968 to 1977 and, alternatively, the log number of terrorist incidents in this
period on the extent of urbanization in 1978 and the number of skyscrapers built. While
there is a positive relationship between terrorism and the extent of urbanization, Glaeser
and Shapiro (2002) assert that “this link is small, statistically weak, and causally dubious”
(p. 223). No evidence is found for an effect of terrorism on the number of tall buildings
built in a country.11
Various studies have estimated the economic effects of the terrorist attacks on September
11, 2001. The direct costs consist of the destruction of infrastructure and human capital.
The collapse of the twin towers destroyed 13 million square feet of real estate, and 30%
of superior office space in downtown New York. But this accounts for only 4% of the
total office space situated in Manhattan. One estimate of the real and human capital costs
ranges from 25 to 60 billion dollars (Becker and Murphy 2001). Another study estimates
the human capital loss to be 40 billion dollars, and the property loss to be between 10 and
13 billion dollars (Navarro and Spencer 2001). Yet another estimate of the total direct
loss is 21.4 billion dollars (International Monetary Fund 1989). Looking at the extent of
destruction relative to the overall US productive capacity indicates that the damage was
minor (Brauer 2002). The estimates of between 10 and 60 billion dollars worth of damage
resulting from the attacks of September 11, 2001 is relatively small compared to the
American GNP of 10 trillion dollars.
                                                 
11 Other studies that discuss the impact of terrorism on urban development are Bram et al. (2002), Harrigan
and Martin (2002), Mills (2002) and Wildasin (2002).
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However, the indirect costs may be substantial. They consist of the induced cost of doing
business, for instance longer waitings at airports, higher friction and transactions costs in
international trade, as well as the cost of the military and civilian resources used to fight
terrorism. To achieve a significant reduction in the probability of falling prey to a terrorist
attack is certainly expensive. The fraction of the economic potential that can be used for
consumption today and in the future is significantly reduced. But it is impossible to attach
any serious figure to these factors. This is particularly so if the effects outside the United
States are also taken into account. Based on a computable general equilibrium model
(Walkenhorst and Dihel 2002), it has been estimated that the indirect cost of increased
economic friction in international trade is larger for other regions of the world than for
North America.
9. National income and growth. Estimating the overall effect of terrorism on the
economy12 is faced with the problem of how the economy would have developed if there
had been less terrorism, or no terrorism at all. To construct a counterfactual is not easy.
An interesting attempt has been made for the Basque country, with a “synthetic” control
region made up of other Spanish regions, but in many ways resembling the relevant
economic characteristics of the Basque country before the onset of political terrorism by
the ETA in the 1970s (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003). The subsequent economic
development of this counterfactual synthetic region is compared to the actual experience
of the Basque country. It is estimated that, after the outbreak of terrorism, the per capita
GDP in the Basque country fell by about 10 percentage points relative to the control
region. This gap tends to widen when terrorist activities are on the increase. If the
terrorist activities by the ETA had a negative economic effect on other Spanish regions
(included in the synthetic control), the GNP gap estimated for the Basque country is a
                                                 
12 The effect of general political instability (or stable political institutions, alternatively) on the growth of
national income has been analyzed using cross section data by Barro (1991), Alesina et al. (1996) and
Acemoglu et al. (2001) among others. The latter studies also address the problem of reverse causality: as
argued by Olson (1982), political instability may not only be a cause but also an effect of economic
fluctuations. The same might be true in the case of terrorism. A notable study analyzing the effect of
income and education on terrorism is a paper by Krueger and Maleckova (2003). On the basis of a variety
of evidence, such as the influence of living standards on the support for violent attacks by Palestinians on
Israelis expressed in opinion polls and a comparison of the characteristics of the Hezbollah activists killed
with those of the general Lebanese population, the authors conclude that terrorism is not a response to bad
economic conditions: “[T]he evidence we have assembled does not indicate a connection between poverty
and terrorism, and we are not aware of compelling evidence that points in the opposite direction” (Krueger
and Maleckova 2003, p. 121).
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lower bound. In contrast, if the terrorist activities diverted investment from the Basque
country to other Spanish regions, the magnitude of the gap is artificially increased.
However, the authors convincingly argue that the two biases are likely to be small.
An extensive VAR study of the macroeconomic effects of terrorism (Blomberg et al.
2004a; see also Blomberg et al. 2004b) uses a panel set with annual observations for 177
countries from 1968 to 2000. It controls for the interactions between terrorism and other
forms of internal and external conflict and is therefore able to differentiate between
similar types of political disruptions. On average, terrorism (captured by the ITERATE
data) is found to depress economic growth in a marked, and statistically significant, way.
However, this effect is considerably smaller and less persistent than that exerted by
external wars and internal conflicts. Spending is diverted from investment to public
expenditures. Interestingly enough, the negative association between terrorism and
economic growth is small and statistically insignificant for advanced (OECD) economies,
which are most affected by terrorism. The depressing effect of terrorism on economic
growth appears to be most significant for developing countries. Overall, the relationship
between terrorism and economic growth can mainly be attributed to country fixed effects.
Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004) focus on one dimension of terrorism, the insecurity which
manifests in daily life. Increasing terror makes life less certain and shorter.13 Using a
closed-economy-infinite-horizon model, the government in charge of public security as a
public good reduces the death toll by stepping up defense expenditures when terrorism
increases. If it acts optimally, it does not fully offset the tide. A long-run equilibrium with
an optimizing government is characterized by lower output, going with a higher intensity
of terror. An econometric test for Israel, based on data from 1950 to 2003, indeed reveals
an increase in the ratio of defense expenditures to GNP from 9% to 12% in the period of
the Intifada (2000-2003:3) and a drastic reduction in output per capita. Over this period,
output per capita declined annually by 3%. If terrorism remains as high as it was in 2003,
per capita GDP will be about 3.5% lower by 2004:3 than if terrorism stops.
                                                 
13 Other dimensions could be the effect of terror on the deterioration of health (thereby lowering
productivity) and on human capital (Tsiddon 1995).
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These effects of terrorist actions on the various sectors and the overall economy do not
capture the total costs of terrorism. Non-market values are, by definition, excluded from
these measures. The fear of individuals and the grief of the victims and the bereaved are
disregarded. It follows that the damage perpetrated by terrorism may be considerably
underestimated. If policy makers take the estimates discussed above seriously, they
would allocate too little money to dealing with terrorism and rather use the funds and
their energy for pursuing other goals. In the following section, therefore, methods are
discussed for capturing total utility losses people suffer as a result of terrorist activities.
4 Utility consequences of terrorism
The disutility from the public bad, terrorism, like the benefits from public goods, is
inherently difficult to measure. However, a wide variety of different approaches for the
measurement of preferences has been developed (see, e.g., Freeman 2003), in particular
to value environmental quality and the cultural heritage. These approaches can potentially
be applied to value the threat of terrorism as well. We briefly discuss existing techniques
emphasizing possible advantages and likely drawbacks in the study of terrorism. The
focus is on a new, and we think, promising approach: the life satisfaction approach.
4.1 Traditional methods
Two avenues have been pursued to infer and elicit individuals’ preferences for public
goods and externalities: stated preference methods on the one hand and revealed
preference methods on the other hand. The most prominent exponent of the former is the
contingent valuation method and of the latter the hedonic market approach.
1. Contingent valuation surveys enable researchers to assess the effect of a reduction of
terrorism on utility, including non-use values.14 Terrorism is directly assessed, using
survey questions on people’s willingness to pay, for example, for a bisection of the
number of terrorist incidents in a region. While this is an appealingly easy framework,
there are a number of difficulties with this approach. The survey respondents find
                                                 
14 See Carson et al. (2003) for an elaborate and state-of-the-art contingent valuation study in the
environmental realm. The credibility and validity of the results based on the contingent valuation method
are the subject of a heated controversy in economic literature, as a symposium in the Journal of Economic
Perspectives (Diamond and Hausman 1994; Hanemann 1994; Portney 1994) demonstrates.
- 20 -
themselves in an unfamiliar situation and may be induced to give strategic responses.
Important design issues to address these problems are the presentation of adequate
information, a credible (hypothetical) payment mechanism and the use of the incentive-
compatible referendum format (Portney 1994). In order to avoid symbolic valuation, a
survey must also contain a detailed description of a hypothetical policy program, which
the respondents believe to be capable of providing the public good in question, i.e. the
reduction in terrorist incidents. In light of the failure of most traditional anti-terrorism
policies, this is likely to be a difficult task.
A basic problem of applying contingent valuation to terrorism is that it is not obvious
what preferences should enter. Two aspects are of particular importance. First,
psychological anomalies play a major role. A vital aspect is that the disparity between
gains and losses matters. It is therefore important whether one asks what people would be
prepared to pay in order to reduce terrorism, or what they would be prepared to accept in
order to tolerate some degree of terrorism. Second, terrorism is an international
phenomenon and terrorists often have no difficulty in moving from one country to
another. For this reason, the anti-terrorism policies of a particular country produce
international or even global externalities. An anti-terrorism policy that successfully
prevents terrorists from attacking a particular country increases the probability of attacks
in other countries (Lee 1988; Sandler and Lapan 1988). On the other hand, anti-terrorism
policies, based on positive incentives (Frey and Luechinger 2003; 2004), entail positive
externalities for other countries. The dimension of the relevant population, whose values
for security from a specific terrorist campaign should be sought, is a question of values.
Another problem with a contingent valuation survey is that individuals evaluate specific
objects or specific victims quite differently from a non-specified, or statistical, victim
(Schelling 1968; Small and Loewenstein 2003). People are prepared to spend much less
on efforts to save as yet unidentified lives than identified lives from terrorist attacks.
Contingent valuation surveys may nevertheless provide valuable insights into the utility
losses imposed by terrorism. So far there is only one survey study that examines the
trade-off between money and terrorism risk (Viscusi and Zeckhauser 2003). The main
research interest of this study, however, is whether the answers reflect a rational response
to terrorism risks. The subjects were asked what increase in the price of a plane ticket
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they would be willing to pay if the risk of a terrorist attack on an airplane were to be
reduced (a) by 50%, (b) to one in a million per flight, (c) to one in 10 million per flight or
finally (d) to zero. The average increase in price subjects are willing to pay for a plane
ticket is (a) ca. 25%, (b) ca. 38%, (c) ca. 53% and (d) ca. 70% respectively. These
estimates reflect a well-known premium for reaching a zero risk level (see Kahneman and
Tversky 1979 for the “certainty effect”).
2. The hedonic market approach is based on the idea that markets, primarily the housing
and the labor markets, reflect the utility losses imposed on individuals by terrorist
activity.15 Higher wages must be paid to compensate employees for the disamenities
incurred by working in a region ridden with terrorism. Similarly, the rent for housing and
land to be paid is negatively affected by terrorism. In equilibrium, the marginal implicit
compensations associated with working or living in a region plagued by terrorism equals
the corresponding marginal willingness to accept. To our knowledge, no study employs
the hedonic market approach in particular, or revealed preference methods in general, to
evaluate the consequences of terrorism.
A major drawback of the hedonic market approach is that it is based on the assumption
that the market is perfect and in equilibrium, and fully reflects changes in the amount and
intensity of terrorism. The adjustment that people are likely to make in response to
changes in the intensity of a terrorist campaign, as well as changes in the supply side of
the hedonic property market, needs to be accounted for (Freeman 2003, pp. 373 and 381).
Similarly, it might be difficult to isolate the effects of terrorism from those caused by
government reactions. Indirect estimations of utility losses can only be applied if the
individuals are aware of changes in the terrorism risk over time and/or differences across
regions. Individuals’ difficulties in assessing terrorism risk may, therefore, hamper the
application of revealed preference methods (see e.g. Downes-Le Guin and Hoffman
1993; Sunstein 2003; Viscusi and Zeckhauser 2003). This also implies that unanticipated
and cataclysmic terrorist acts cannot be evaluated. Further, revealed preferences may
                                                 
15 Exemplary contributions are Blomquist et al. (1988) and Chay and Greenstone (2001). Another revealed
preference method that potentially allows for the assessment of utility losses due to terrorism is the defense
expenditure approach or averting behavior method. The basic idea of this method is that individuals’
evaluation for a change in the provision of a public good is reflected in accompanying changes in
expenditures for substitutive private goods (see e.g. Zeckhauser and Fisher 1976).
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reflect anticipated future risk rather than current risk. Finally, revealed preference
methods cannot capture non-use values.
4.2 Effects on Life Satisfaction
People’s assessment of their overall well-being can be directly captured by measures of
reported subjective well-being. In large representative questionnaire studies, individuals
are asked about their level of life satisfaction or happiness. This opens new possibilities
for studying important economic questions (see Frey and Stutzer 2002a,b for surveys).
For example, with reported subjective well-being as a proxy measure for utility, it is now
a straightforward strategy to directly evaluate public goods, or a public bad like terrorism,
in utility terms. By measuring the marginal utility of a public good or the marginal
disutility of a public bad, as well as the marginal utility of income, the marginal rate of
substitution between income and the public good can be calculated. This allows for the
computation of relevant welfare measures for marginal and infra-marginal changes in the
public good provision. We call this the life satisfaction approach.16
It stands to reason that people living in a country rife with terrorism are less happy than
those living under more orderly political conditions. An example is the Dominican
Republic in 1962 where, after president Trujillo’s murder, the political situation was very
unsettled and political chaos was a real threat. The level of life satisfaction recorded in
that country was the lowest ever recorded, namely 1.6 on a 0 to 10 scale. In contrast, in
politically stable democracies, such as Switzerland, Norway or Denmark, the population
expresses high levels of life satisfaction. The corresponding values were, for example, in
the 1990s 8.16 for Denmark, 8.02 for Switzerland and 7.66 for Norway. Thus, happiness
and political stability seem to be closely related.
The life satisfaction approach has several important advantages over the approaches
discussed so far in measuring people’s utility losses due to terrorist activity. Contrary to
contingent valuation surveys, this approach does not rely on asking people how they
value a public good or an anti-terrorism policy. The hypothetical nature of these
questions and the unfamiliar situation for the respondents are the principal reasons for
                                                 
16 See Welsch (2002) and van Praag and Baarsma (2004) for the evaluation of externalities in the
environmental realm with reported subjective well-being data.
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most of the skepticism about, and problems concerning, the contingent valuation method.
It is a demanding cognitive task, and superficial or socially desirable responses, without
adequate consideration of the budget constraint or substitutes, can result. To correctly
state one’s own current level of life satisfaction, in contrast, is much less demanding and
strategic responses are unlikely. Similarly, the stringent conditions of the approaches
based on revealed preferences, like housing or labor market equilibrium in the case of the
hedonic market approach, do not have to be met in order to evaluate welfare effects
through the use of life satisfaction data.17
Frey et al. (2004) use the life satisfaction approach to assess the costs of terrorism in
France, the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. By way of illustration, an
analysis of the Northern Ireland conflict is presented here.
Life satisfaction data are taken from the Euro-Barometer Survey Series (1970-1999); the
variable is the categorical response to the following question: “On the whole, are you
very satisfied [4], fairly satisfied [3], not very satisfied [2], or not at all satisfied [1] with
the life you lead?” As an indicator for the salience and intensity of terrorist activity, the
number of deaths resulting from the conflict in Northern Ireland is taken, as compiled by
Sutton (1994; an updated index is provided by the Conflict Archive on the Internet
(www.cain.ulst.ac.uk)). This indicator is not restricted to terrorism in particular, but
includes political violence in general. In order to identify the effect of terrorism on
individuals’ life satisfaction, the authors use a combined time-series (for the period 1975
to 1998) and cross-section analysis (with Northern Ireland, the rest of the United
Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland). Specifically, a micro-econometric happiness
function is specified, whereby the life satisfaction of an individual living in a particular
region at a particular time is explained by differences in the level of terrorism across the
three regions and over time, the individual’s household income, other personal and socio-
demographic characteristics, as well as region and time fixed effects.
                                                 
17 However, there are the conditions of cardinality and interpersonal comparability of the individual
statements of well-being. Although economists are likely to be skeptical about both claims, there is a lot of
evidence that both of them may be less of a problem on a practical level than on a theoretical level (see e.g.
Kahneman 1999; Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters 2004). Furthermore, the life satisfaction approach has
several problems in common with the revealed preference methods: (i) It is not immune to spurious
correlations that are the result of omitted variables, (ii) perceived risks must be correlated with objective
risk measures and (iii) pure public goods and, therefore, the existence value cannot be captured.
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The estimation results suggest that the number of terrorist fatalities has a statistically
significant negative effect on reported life satisfaction. For an increase of one standard
deviation in the number of recorded fatalities, i.e. an increase of 53.7 fatalities, life
satisfaction is lowered by 0.041 on the four-point scale. This effect is about a tenth of the
effect of being unemployed rather than employed. Thus, the indicator for terrorism is
correlated with people’s subjective well-being in a sizeable way.
The estimated coefficients for terrorism and individual income can be used to calculate
the hypothetical willingness-to-pay for a discrete change in the level of terrorism. Frey et
al. (2004) calculate a hypothetical willingness-to-pay of a resident of Northern Ireland for
a reduction in the number of fatalities to the average level of Great Britain and the
Republic of Ireland. Accordingly, a resident of Northern Ireland (with average household
income) would be willing to pay around 41% of his income for a reduction in terrorist
activity to the level that prevails in the more peaceful parts of the country or the sister
republic. This estimate is surprisingly high. However, it might to some extent reflect the
ferocity of the conflict. After all, Northern Ireland was on the brink of all-out civil war;
Fay et al. (1999, p. 204), for example, estimate that around two thirds of the Northern
Irish population live in households where someone has been injured in a conflict related
incident.
This result indicates that utility losses may far exceed the economic consequences
discussed in section 3.
5 Concluding remarks
Much of the research on terrorism, even by economists, is based on the number of
incidents and casualties. As our survey shows, one can go much further. A sizeable
literature already exists on the economic consequences of terrorism, such as on tourism,
foreign direct investment, savings and consumption, investment, stock prices, foreign
trade, the urban economy, and national income and growth. But the studies have so far
neglected to analyze the utility losses induced by terrorism, which we suggest are much
larger than the purely economic ones. The standard way of measuring the benefits (or
costs) of public goods (or bads) is to employ stated preference methods, in particular
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contingent valuation surveys, and revealed preference methods, for example by looking at
hedonic markets. However, these approaches are faced with considerable problems,
especially when attempting to estimate the utility losses due to terrorism, and have
therefore not yet been used for that purpose.
We propose a new approach based on life satisfaction or subjective well-being data,
which are collected independently of the data on terrorist activities, and are therefore not
biased by any immediate priming effects. The estimates presented reveal that terrorism
leads to considerable reductions in life satisfaction, suggesting that individuals incur large
utility losses. Individuals would need to receive substantial increases in income to be
compensated for the harm inflicted by terrorism. The results reported refer to the
Northern Ireland conflict only. It is certainly necessary to apply the approach to different
countries, different periods of time and different types of terrorism. Future research
should undertake systematic comparisons between the standard methods of measuring the
benefits of public goods and the life satisfaction approach. It should be taken into account
that the measures of life satisfaction used here could be improved upon. The life
satisfaction approach should therefore not be criticized solely on the basis of the existing
quality of subjective well-being measures. Rather, scholars should also evaluate to what
extent a meaningful relationship between life satisfaction data and terrorist acts can be
established and econometrically estimated.
Future research should also endeavor to distinguish between the direct effects of a
terrorist incident and the indirect consequences. The latter include the costs imposed on
the population of the targeted country by the political reactions. As discussed, numerous
estimates reported do not only reflect the direct consequences of terrorism but also the
impact of the subsequent counter measures. In the case of foreign trade and the aviation
industry, for example, enhanced security measures are likely to account to a large extent
for the reduction in bilateral trade and the drop in demand respectively. The political
reactions may reflect voters’ demands for increased security or a strategic exploitation by
politicians of the “rally round the flag” effect and may range from increased expenditures
for military and secret services to restrictions in human rights. Such more extended
studies would not only require data on the number and severity of terrorist attacks, but
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would also need to analyze the determinants of the political actions imposing these
indirect costs on the population.
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